TSC criterion CC3.1 explicitly requires the entity to identify and analyse risks to objectives. SOC 2 audits routinely fail this control because companies show a one-page risk summary instead of an actual register. This 28-row register covers every CC criterion, scores inherent and residual risk on a 5×5 scale, and is ready to use as evidence for CC3.1, CC3.2, CC3.4, and CC9.1.
Likelihood × Impact on a 1–5 scale (5×5 matrix). 15+ = treat now, 8–14 = treat per plan, ≤7 = accept w/ monitoring. AICPA permits any documented methodology — auditors just need to see it consistently applied.
| ID | Threat | Vulnerability | Inherent | Control | Residual | Treatment | Owner | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R-01 | Tone-from-the-top deficiency | Leadership doesn't reinforce security in all-hands / Slack | 3×4=12 | Documented information-security policy signed by CEO, quarterly all-hands security update. | 2×3=6 | Mitigate | CEO | CC1.1 |
| R-02 | Undocumented org structure | Unclear reporting lines for security function | 3×3=9 | Org chart in handbook; security function reports to CTO/CISO with board visibility. | 2×2=4 | Mitigate | CEO | CC1.3 |
| R-03 | Background check failure | New hire with disqualifying history granted access | 2×4=8 | Pre-employment background check via Checkr or equivalent for all staff w/ data access. | 1×3=3 | Mitigate | HR | CC1.4 |
| ID | Threat | Vulnerability | Inherent | Control | Residual | Treatment | Owner | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R-04 | Customers unaware of security commitments | No public security/trust page | 3×3=9 | Trust page (security.<domain>.com) with policy summary, sub-processor list, status page. | 2×2=4 | Mitigate | Marketing | CC2.3 |
| R-05 | Internal staff unaware of policies | Policies stored in inaccessible folder | 4×3=12 | Policies in handbook (Notion/Confluence), annual acknowledgement w/ HRIS log. | 2×2=4 | Mitigate | HR | CC2.2 |
| ID | Threat | Vulnerability | Inherent | Control | Residual | Treatment | Owner | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R-06 | Material risks not identified | No formal risk-assessment cadence | 4×5=20 | Quarterly risk-assessment workshop; risk register reviewed by management. | 2×4=8 | Mitigate | CISO | CC3.1 / CC3.2 |
| R-07 | Fraud risk not considered | Procurement / payroll fraud potential ignored | 2×4=8 | Annual fraud-risk assessment, segregation-of-duties matrix for finance. | 1×3=3 | Mitigate | CFO | CC3.3 |
| R-08 | Significant change not assessed | New product launch deployed without security review | 4×4=16 | Change-management policy requires security review for material changes; ticket evidence. | 2×3=6 | Mitigate | Engineering | CC3.4 |
| ID | Threat | Vulnerability | Inherent | Control | Residual | Treatment | Owner | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R-09 | Policy non-compliance undetected | No control-effectiveness testing | 4×4=16 | Continuous-control monitoring tool (Vanta/Drata/Secureframe); monthly evidence review. | 2×3=6 | Mitigate | Security | CC4.1 |
| R-10 | Deficiencies not remediated | Findings sit open beyond SLA | 3×4=12 | Tracked CAP w/ owner + due date; >30d overdue escalates to CISO. | 2×3=6 | Mitigate | CISO | CC4.2 |
| ID | Threat | Vulnerability | Inherent | Control | Residual | Treatment | Owner | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R-11 | Logical access excessive | Default share-everything; no role-based controls | 5×5=25 | RBAC by role, least privilege, JIT for production, quarterly access reviews. | 2×4=8 | Mitigate | IT | CC6.1 / CC6.3 |
| R-12 | Authentication weakness | Password-only access to sensitive systems | 5×5=25 | MFA required (FIDO2 preferred) for all production + admin systems; SSO via Okta/Google. | 2×4=8 | Mitigate | IT | CC6.1 |
| R-13 | Access not deprovisioned timely | Departing staff retain access for days | 4×5=20 | SCIM-driven deprovisioning < 24h of HRIS termination event; quarterly attestation. | 2×3=6 | Mitigate | IT | CC6.2 / CC6.3 |
| R-14 | Physical access to data | Office laptops left unlocked | 3×3=9 | Auto-lock 5 min idle, full-disk encryption, MDM-enforced. | 2×2=4 | Mitigate | IT | CC6.4 |
| R-15 | Data not encrypted at rest | Backups in clear text | 3×5=15 | AES-256 at rest across all stores; KMS-managed keys; backup encryption mandatory. | 1×3=3 | Mitigate | SRE | CC6.7 |
| R-16 | Data not encrypted in transit | Internal services on HTTP | 3×4=12 | TLS 1.2+ for all service-to-service traffic; mTLS in production VPC. | 1×3=3 | Mitigate | SRE | CC6.7 |
| R-17 | Malware on endpoints | No EDR; consumer AV only | 4×4=16 | EDR (CrowdStrike/SentinelOne) on all endpoints; managed via MDM. | 2×3=6 | Mitigate | IT | CC6.8 |
| ID | Threat | Vulnerability | Inherent | Control | Residual | Treatment | Owner | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R-18 | Production incident undetected | No alerting on critical services | 4×5=20 | 24/7 monitoring (Datadog/Grafana), paging on SLO breach, runbook per service. | 2×4=8 | Mitigate | SRE | CC7.1 / CC7.2 |
| R-19 | Vulnerabilities un-remediated | Patch SLAs not defined | 4×5=20 | 30/60/90 day patch SLA by severity; weekly authenticated vuln scans; SLA dashboard. | 2×4=8 | Mitigate | IT | CC7.1 |
| R-20 | Incident response inconsistent | No documented IR plan | 4×5=20 | IR plan w/ severity matrix, on-call rota, annual tabletop exercise. | 2×4=8 | Mitigate | CISO | CC7.3 / CC7.4 |
| R-21 | Backup failure | Backups never tested | 3×5=15 | Quarterly test-restore w/ evidence; immutable / cross-region backups. | 1×3=3 | Mitigate | SRE | CC7.5 |
| ID | Threat | Vulnerability | Inherent | Control | Residual | Treatment | Owner | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R-22 | Unauthorised production change | Direct DB access; no PR review | 4×5=20 | All changes via PR + ≥1 reviewer; CI runs tests + SAST; audited deploy logs. | 2×4=8 | Mitigate | Engineering | CC8.1 |
| R-23 | Untested release breaks production | No staging environment | 4×4=16 | Mandatory staging deployment + smoke tests before prod; change ticket per release. | 2×3=6 | Mitigate | Engineering | CC8.1 |
| ID | Threat | Vulnerability | Inherent | Control | Residual | Treatment | Owner | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R-24 | Vendor breach impacts customers | No vendor risk programme | 3×5=15 | TPRM: SIG/CAIQ + SOC 2 review pre-onboarding; annual recertification. | 2×4=8 | Mitigate | Security | CC9.2 |
| R-25 | Business interruption | No tested BC/DR plan | 3×5=15 | Documented BCP/DRP, annual tabletop, RPO 1h / RTO 4h tested. | 2×4=8 | Mitigate | SRE | CC9.1 / A1.2 |
| ID | Threat | Vulnerability | Inherent | Control | Residual | Treatment | Owner | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R-26 | Data subject request unhandled | No DSR pipeline; missed deadlines | 3×4=12 | DSR intake form + 30-day SLA; centralised PII inventory; automated deletion. | 2×3=6 | Mitigate | DPO / Legal | P5.0 |
| ID | Threat | Vulnerability | Inherent | Control | Residual | Treatment | Owner | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R-27 | Customer data leakage | Engineers query prod for debugging using real PII | 3×4=12 | Prod PII access via approved tickets only; production data not allowed in lower envs. | 2×3=6 | Mitigate | Engineering | C1.1 |
| ID | Threat | Vulnerability | Inherent | Control | Residual | Treatment | Owner | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R-28 | Single point of failure | Single AZ deployment | 3×5=15 | Multi-AZ minimum; multi-region for tier-1 services; chaos testing. | 2×4=8 | Mitigate | SRE | A1.2 |
No. CC3.1 requires you to identify and analyse risks but the scoring approach (qualitative L×I, quantitative ALE, FAIR) is your choice. Document whichever you use in a 'Risk Methodology' section so the auditor can validate consistency.
No. One register covers Security (mandatory) and any additional categories (Availability, Confidentiality, Processing Integrity, Privacy) you've scoped. Use a 'Category' tag per row.
AICPA expects review on a defined cadence (most companies do quarterly) plus on any 'significant change' (CC3.4) — new product, new vendor, new region, post-incident.
It's a credible starting point that passes most CPA firms' baseline expectations. Customise to your environment and have your auditor review it during the readiness/Stage 1 walkthrough — that's free feedback.
Drop your current policy or describe your environment — ComplianceIQ scores every clause against the framework and tells you which register rows are actually mitigated.
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